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CREDIT CARDS
Porcelli will have little actual impact beyond the third circuit and the
situation as it existed in Newark.
STEPHEN JAY EDEILSTEIN
Consumer Protection-Credit Card Protection Under the
Truth in Lending Act
On October 26, 1970, in response to widespread complaints, Congress
amended1 the Truth in Lending Act to expand consumer protection into
the area of credit cards.2 The legislation outlaws further issuance of un-
solicited credit cards' and imposes stiff criminal penalties for the
fraudulent use of cards to charge more than five thousand dollars.' The
most important provision limits the liability of the consumer for a lost or
'Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 501-03 (Oct. 26, 1970), amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-64
(Supp. IV, 1965-69).
2The tremendous upsurge in credit cards has brought an increased awareness
of the abuses associated with their use. From Dec. 31, 1967, to June 30, 1969, the
Federal Research Board found that credit outstanding on bank credit cards increased
from 800 million dollars to 1.7 billion dollars. The year-to-year increase on oil
company cards is 200 million dollars. Hearings on S. 721 Before the Subcomr.
on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings]. The abuses are
more often related to unsolicited cards which (1) have encouraged some consumers
to spend beyond their means possibly to the point of becoming bankrupt, (2) have
been burdensome to some consumers because they were hard to destroy, (3) have
been an unwarranted intrusion into consumers' personal lives, (4) have encouraged
crime because they were easily stolen and quite negotiable, and (5) have had a
potentially inflationary impact upon the economy. Another factor common to all
cards has been the possibility of unlimited liability in the event that the card was
lost or stolen. S. REP. No. 91-739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as 1970 S. REP.]. The statistical impact of this last point was measured in
Murray, A Legal-Empirical Study of the Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards, 21
U. MIAMI L. lRv. 811 (1967).
1 Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 502(a) (Oct. 26, 1970). This provision is far-reaching
because it also concerns renewals of existing credit cards. Renewals can be auto-
matic, i.e., without request by the holder, only if the card had been specifically
requested initially. Unsolicited cards that were issued prior to the act may not be
renewed unless the holder so requests. Id.; 1970 S. EP. 6. What impact will this
have upon the firms who have used both solicited and unsolicited cards in the past
and are unable to distinguish the accounts of holders using solicited cards from those
using unsolicited cards? 1970 S. REP. 13. Another argument of those opposed
to outlawing the unsolicited card is that this prohibition makes it impossible for new
enterprises in the credit card field to get off the ground and compete since the
sending of unsolicited cards is the only practical way to build up a large backlog of
customers. 1969 Hearings 24-26.
'Maximum of ten-thousand-dollar fine and five years in prison. Pub. L. No. 91-
508, § 502(a) (Oct. 26, 1970).
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stolen card to fifty dollars if the use of the card occurred after January 24,
1971.5
Prior to the act, according to the terms on most cards, the cardholder
was to be liable for unauthorized use unless he notified the company of
the loss or the theft of the card in advance of the unauthorized use.' In a
typical case,7 a holder of a Texaco credit card was assessed with liability
for 570 dollars in automotive bills which had been charged to his card
without his knowledge or consent. The first time that he used the card
he neglected to retrieve it from the service station attendant. He failed to
notify the company of the loss and four months later was billed for the
unauthorized use. The court reasoned that the sending of the card to the
individual by the oil company was an offer to contract according to the
terms printed on the card, and the individual's retention and subsequent
use of the card constituted an acceptance of the offer and its terms.8
Hence, the holder was contractually9 bound to pay the bills.'
'Id. §§ 502(a), 503(2).
'The data of notice would vary depending on the specific wording of the contract
and interpretations of notice appearing in state law. Several possibilities are the
date notice is sent, the date notice is received, or some artificial date such as ten
days after receipt, if the contract terms so specified.
Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, 34 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Mun. Ct. N.Y.
City 1962), aff'd per curiat, 39 Misc. 2d 552, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
834 Misc. 2d at -, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 56. Although the initial use of the card
would normally be the act of acceptance, under some circumstances retention of the
card without use might be sufficient. See Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card
Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L. Rnv. 459, 481 (1960). Generally, for
acts of acceptance in this context see RESTATEmENT OF CONTRAcTS §§ 21, 72 (1932) ;
1 A. CoRmi , CONTRACTS §§ 62, 70, 72 (1963). In situations where the acceptance
of the instrument containing the terms constitutes acceptance of the contract, the
weight of authority holds this to be assent to all the terms printed therein, whether
or not they are actually read. Kergald v. Armstrong Transfer Express Co., 330
Mass. 254, 113 N.E.2d 53 (1953), and cases collected therein. Nonetheless the
language of the terms should be conspicuous and understandable. See Macauley,
Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Bsiness Run by IBM Machine, the
Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. Rv. 1051 (1966).
' Some courts analyze the credit card transaction using theories of guaranty and
assignment. The holder is a guarantor for others using his card while the issuer
is the assignee of the merchant for collection of the claims. This preserves defenses
which the holder has against the merchant, such as for defective goods, when the
issuer attempts to collect on his assignment. Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Roofing
Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945). For difficulties with the assignment
theory see South, Credit Cards: A Primer; 23 Bus. LAW. 327, 331-32 (1968).
"0Accord, Read v. Gulf Oil Corp., 114 Ga. App. 21, 150 S.E.2d 319 (1966);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Duke, 441 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1969). There has been a
tendency in some jurisdictions to exact a standard of due care upon the merchant
and the issuer if the holder is to be held liable. Allied Stores of N.Y., Inc. v.
Funderburke, 52 Misc. 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. City 1967) (issuer
violated standard of due care by permitting 237 sales slips bearing false signatures
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The new federal legislation does not change the basic cause of action
when the card issuer seeks to collect on unpaid bills. State courts"1 will
try to ascertain the exact contractual obligations of the holder in deter-
mining what, if anything, he must remit to the issuer. These obligations
are now, however, limited by the new law, and the card issuer is induced
to change its tactics in order to minimize the limitations. It can allege
that the use of the card was authorized, carry the burden of proof on this
issue, 2 and avoid the limitation on the amount of liability. Unauthorized
use is defined in the act as "a use of a credit card by a person other
than the cardholder who does not have actual, implied, or apparent
authority for such use and from which the cardholder receives no benefit."':
Clearly, the initial test for authorized use is agency, and state law 4 must
be consulted in order to resolve the issue.
Under traditional agency concepts, the cardholder is the principal and
the merchant is the third party; the issuer is superimposed in the mer-
chant's place as the collector of the account. The issuer must show that
the person who used the card had the authority to bind the cardholder
to obligations with third parties. Actual authority is created by a man-
ifestation of consent to the agent by the principal that he may act for the
principal. 5 When the act is' specifically mentioned, there is express
to accumulate in thirty days because of inadequate data processing procedures);
Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960) (question for jury on
due care of merchant when address on card was in one state and the license plates
on the car of user indicated another). See Note, Contracts-Credit Cards-
Liability of Holder for Unauthorized Use-Issuer's and Merchant's Duty of Due
Care in Accepting Charges, 43 N.C.L. REv. 416, 422 (1965), and Note, Credit-
Issuer's Recovery from Bona Fide Credit Card Holder for Purchases Made by
Unauthorized Person Requires Showing That Due Care Was Exercised in Honor-
ing Card, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 266, 268 (1960), for competing policies behind such
decisions.
"' State courts handle lawsuits based on contract. Conceivably it could be tried
in federal court in the event of diversity of citizenship, but a case in which the
liability alleged is in excess of the ten-thousand-dollar jurisdictional amount would
be unusual. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964).
" This burden of proof is required by the statute. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 502 (a)
(Oct. 26, 1970).
Id. § 501 (emphasis added).
" If the case were tried in the federal courts, a problem could arise, at least
theoretically, in the choice of federal or state law. It is highl unlikely'that federal
law would be applied since there is no substantial federal interest involved. See Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); C. WRIG r FEDERAL COURTS §§ 55-60 (2d
ed. 1970).
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) o AGEN cY § 7 (1957) ; W. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGiNcY
,§8A (1964) [hereinafter cited as SEAvEY]. The term "actual authority" is
generally shortened to "authorit' for purpoges of clarity. E.g., SEAVEY § 8A.
Contra, e.g., Coblentz v. Riskin, 74 Nev. 53, 57, 322 P.2d 905, 907 (1958).
1971]
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actual authority to do that act; when the instructions state the general
nature of the status of the agent, there is implied actual authority to
do acts consistent with this instruction."0 There is no distinction in the
powers bestowed by express and implied actual authority-the legal effect
is the same.17 In the credit card context the former is demonstrated by
the principal's command to his agent "take my card and fill the car with
gasoline." An example of the latter is the situation where an employee who
travels for a firm is allowed the use of a company car with a gasoline credit
card in the glove compartment.
Apparent authority differs from actual authority in that it depends
on manifestations by the principal to the third party rather than to the
agent.18 This authority arises when the principal leads the third party to
reasonably believe that the professed agent is acting in his behalf. 19 The
usual application of apparent authority is where a prior relation of prin-
cipal and agent is terminated and the principal has made no effort to
repudiate the status after it has in fact ceased."0 This failure to reveal is
conduct which might cause third parties to reasonably believe that the
agency relationship still exists. Thus, a discharged employee might con-
tinue to use the firm's misappropriated credit card at businesses with which
he had formerly dealt, and apparent authority would bind the former
employer absent notification that the employee had been discharged.
Implied actual authority and apparent authority are often confused
despite being based upon different types of behavior on the part of the
principal. The sufficiency of the manifestations made to either the agent
or to the third party is the chief concern of the court, but this is not
determined through strict rules; rather, it depends upon the exact conduct
of the principal and upon present and prior relations between all parties.
Both doctrines might operate on the same fact situation. For example,
opponents of the new law were concerned about the situation where the
holder "purposely refrained from informing the issuer of misuse about
which he had actual knowledge."'" Yet this could be considered apparent
authority if the card user had previously possessed actual authority, the
revocation of which had not been communicated by the principal to con-
cerned third parties such as the issuer. This behavior, might also be
1 0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7, Comment c (1957) ; SEAvEY § 8C.
1T SEAVEY § 8C.
'
8
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1957) ; SEAVEY § 8D.
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, Comment c (1957) ; SEAVEY § 8D.
2
oRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, Comment a (1957).
21 1970 S. REP. 11.
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classified as implied actual authority if the card user knew of the prin-
cipal's continued failure to object to the misuse, since he could infer con-
sent from the principal's actions. Liability would be premised on the idea
that "a reasonable person in the position of the principal knowing of un-
authorized acts and not consenting to their continuance would do some-
thing to indicate his dissent." However, it remains for the courts .to
backlog a large number of such situations upon which the presence or
absence of liability is predicated before clarity will emerge.
Other doctrines, such as estoppel and inherent agency power,2 might
also be utilized by the court in identifying an agency relationship. In
addition, even though agency cannot be found, the use is still characterized
as authorized if it is beneficial to the holder,24 and this possibility should
not be overlooked.
In the event that the card issuer fails to establish that the use was
authorized, the fifty-dollar limitation on liability becomes effective.
Yet even to assure this lessened recovery the issuer must prove compliance
with other parts of the act. The issuer must show that the use preceded
any notification from the cardholder of the loss or theft, that it had pro-
vided the holder with a prestamped, self-addressed notification form which
would be mailed if there were loss or theft, that it had provided adequate
notice to the holder as to potential liability, and that the card was not an
unsolicited card. 6 As of January 24, 1972, there will be added the require-
ment that there be a method of identifying authorized users incorporated
into the transaction.
2 7
It should be noted that the issuer is required to carry the burden of
proof as to lack of notification prior to unauthorized use. Normally, the
party taking the position that notice was given must produce evidence on
this point and a showing, for example, that a correctly addressed letter
was put in the mail creates a presumption in his favor.2" The other party
' ESTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY § 26, Comment d (1957).
's Id. §§ 8A, B; SEAvEY §§ 8E, F.2
1Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 501 (Oct. 26, 1970).
" Id. § 502(a).
26 Id.2 7 Id.
8 Henderson v. Carbondale Coal & Coke Co., 140 U.S. 25, 36 (1891). If the
evidence which creates the presumption is not disputed by, the other party, then,
depending on its strength, either a prima facie case is established for: the jury o'r
the presumption is transformed into a conclusion as a matter of law. C. McCoRMIcK,
EVIDENCE § 308 (1954). -When a presumption arises in favor of notice, it is cOn-
clusive when evidence to the contrary is not introduced. 9 3. WIMORE, EVIDmECE
§2519(B) (1940). . - .
1971]
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then presents evidence showing lack of receipt, and the issue becomes one
for the jury.2 However, the statute puts the onus on the party alleging
no receipt to carry the burden of proof on the issue. Ideally, there will be
a jury instruction to this effect and the ultimate result will be that it will
become easier for the sender to estabilsh notice. The precise issue, accord-
ing to regulations30 promulgated by the Federal Reserve System, is
whether the holder took "such steps as might be reasonably required in
the ordinary course of business to provide the card issuer with the per-
tinent information .... 31 The notice is "considered given at the time
of receipt or, whether or not received, at the time ordinarily required for
transmission, whichever is earlier.""2  This definition plainly anticipates
:the situation where the issuer claims not to have received notice but the
finder of fact disagrees.
The issue of notice is simplified if the issuer can show the second of
the requirements-the fact that the holder had been provided with the pre-
stamped notification-form. The expectation is that the holder will use this
form in event of loss or theft, and thus the possibility of misaddressed
letters is minimized. The presumption of receipt operates in favor of the
issuer if he presents evidence such as a mailing list containing the holder's
name and the testimony of an employee to the effect that all the members
of the list were sent the notification form.38 The same presumption exists
-on similar evidence when the issuer attempts to show compliance with the
third requirement that the cardholder is to be given adequate notice 4 of
his pptential liability. This might have been printed on the billing state-
ment or on the credit card; if it were sent as a printed notice then it must
"be followed by another notice each succeeding two years. 85
"2 Henderson v. Carbondale Coal & Coke Co., 140 U.S. 25, *37 (1891).8o FEDERAL RESERVE SysTEm PREss RELEASE (Jan. 20, 1971) contains amend-
ments to Regulation Z, Part 226, the present version of which appears in 12 C.F.R.
.§ 226 (1969) [these amendments hereinafter will be cited as Reg. Z, § 226.13].
"Reg. Z, § 226.13(f).
1d.
88 See discussion in note 28 supra.,
8 The act requires that the notice must set "forth the pertinent facts clearly and
conspicuously so that a person against whom it is to operate could reasonably be
expected to have noticed it and understood its meaning." Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 501
,.Oct. 26; 1970).
,,. "Reg. Z, §226.13(c) (3). The recommended form, assuming the italicized
-hypothetical- facts, is et out in the regulations: "You may be liable for the un-
,authorized rise of your credit card. You will not be liable for unauthorized use
-which occurs after you notify Plastic Card Company at Windborn, N.Y. 00000,
:orally or in writing of loss, theft, or possible unauthorized use. In any case liability
shall not exceed $50." Id. § 226.13(e).
[Vol. 49
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To satisfy the fourth requirement, the card issuer would simply pro-
duce the request of the cardholder in order to show that the card was
requested. If the card were previously unsolicited but changed in. status
by a requested renewal, then this renewal form would be presented as
evidence. To comply with the requirement of an identification procedure,
the issuer should have no difficulty in showing that his system had been
revamped in order to produce a signature card or a card with the picture
of the holder appearing on it.36
The overall scheme of legislation reveals that Congress has erected
many hurdles in order to frustrate the card issuer who is seeking recovery
when the card has fallen into the hands of an unauthorized user. The
strict limitation to a maximum fifty-dollar recovery obviously deters
litigation when the issuer weighs the expenses of a lawsuit against ex-
pected recovery. Since arguably "[m] ore strict or complicated identifica-
tion procedures ...will discourage cardholders and merchants,"'3 it is
questionable whether issuers will bother to comport with the standards
necessary for even the limited recovery, for fear of losing business. The
end result, perhaps justifiable, is to shift the burden of risk to the card
issuer. The issuer charges interest on its accounts and assesses a collec-
tion fee against the merchant; as a matter of economics it would appear to
be the party on whom the risk should fall.8 Since in the future issuers
might charge an issuance fee to offsetthe risk, consumers might think
twice before requesting cards, thus leading to a more respofisible decision
on their part. Consumer costs for liability insurance are virtually wiped
out by the limited liability provision, 9 although one who possesses
numerous cards might seek insurance due to the increased risk factor.
40
"These are the suggested methods. 1970 S. REP. 8. The regulations add finger-
print and electronic or mechanical confirmation to the possibilities. Reg. Z,
§ 226.13 (d).
"Note, Credit Cards: Distributing Fraud Loss, 77 YALE L.J. 1418, 1429
(1968).
" The interest figure is set at eighteen per cent on bills not paid within thirty
days and experience has shown that roughly one-half of the accounts are paid
within this time. 1969 Hearings 121. The average cost to retailers runs five per
cent of purchase price. Id. at 138. The loss on accounts had been set at four per
cent prior to the act, although some issuers had much better records. Id. at 120.
Even with a shift in risk for unauthorized use, a carefully run credit card system
would still appear to be a very profitable operation.
"Id. at 85.
'Q Obviously the fifty-dollar limitation is in effect for each card rather than for
the whole lot. The term "unauthorized use" is defined as "a use ... by a person
who does not have... authority .... " Pub. L. No. 91-508 § 501 (Oct. 26,
1970). The appearance of the article "a" as a modifier of "use" is unfortunate since
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In short, it must be expected that very few cases will arise under the
act, with the card issuer being content to bear the losses,4 ' though passing
them on in part to the consumer and the merchant through increased costs.
JOHN WOODWARD DEs
Criminal Procedure-Double Jeopardy: In the Interest of
Public Justice
The "universal maxim of the common law,"' that no one should be
twice vexed for the same cause, was elevated to a position of constitutional
.dignity by the adoption of the fifth amendment.2 Today, it is among the
most fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights.3 However, before a
man can "be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"" there must have been
initial jeopardy. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in United
States ex rel. Somerville v. Illinois,5 recently considered the problem of
when and under what circumstances jeopardy is deemed to have attached
so as to bar a subsequent prosecution. Petitioner Donald Somerville was
indicted for theft on March 19, 1964. On November 1, 1965, his case
the immediate implication is that the definition can apply to only one transaction
and not to a series of transactions. From a pragmatic point of view, this is un-
tenable since it would wipe out effective limitation of liability and destroy the intent
to protect the cardholder which is the basis of the act. Testimony before the com-
mittee that entertained the bill reveals that the spokesman for the American Bankers
Association assumed the limitation to apply to a series of unauthorized uses rather
than to each unauthorized use of the card. His statement was not contradicted.
1969 Hearings 107. If this assumption is not borne out in the courts, the need for
liability insurance will be renewed.
"According to a representative of the Federal Trade Commission, earliest
indications under the act point to this result since most companies are not bothering
to meet the requirements. Raleigh News and Observer, Jan. 28, 1971, at 35, col. 3.
14 W. BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335.
"nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See J. SIGLER, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 1-37, 226 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as SIGLER].
'Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969). This case applied the
double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
'429 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court has recently vacated
the seventh circuit's decision in Somervile and remanded the case for reconsidera-
tion in light of the decisions in United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547 (1971), and
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963). 39 U.S.L.W. 3436 (U.S. Apr. 6,
1971). These cases are discussed generally infra.
[Vol. 49
